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Abstract 3 
The continued rise of global disaster losses pushes our attention yet further to the causal factors that 4 
drive risks, beyond the frame of standardised risk assessment models. A key gap in our understanding 5 
of the causality of disasters remains establishing how spatially and temporally distant factors – ‘root 6 
causes’ – drive local risk conditions. This is particularly the case for small-scale but high-impact 7 
disasters. This includes understanding the role that institutions play in influencing such pathways of 8 
risk production. This paper addresses this question using a holistic approach to risk analysis that links 9 
past drivers to contemporary conditions. We apply this in three case studies of coastal flood 10 
management in urban areas of differential size and integration within the European Union - Rethymno 11 
(Crete), Genoa (Italy) and St Maarten (Dutch Caribbean). The paper reveals the importance of local 12 
institutions in mediating the impacts of higher-level economic and political changes on local risks. It 13 
provides new empirical evidence of the relationship between austerity, institutional reform and local 14 
disaster risk reduction.  The analysis supports a stronger causal epistemology of resilience to disasters 15 
but also leads to re-consideration of the institutional entry points for risk reduction, and the importance 16 
of considering context and trade-offs.     17 
Keywords: Flood Risk Management; Root Causes; Austerity; Disaster Risk Governance; Urban 18 
Resilience; Small Scale Disasters 19 
Highlights 20 
 Risks are co-constructed between higher-level and local institutional pathways. 21 
 Informal political institutions exert strong influence on local risk reduction. 22 
 A risk assessment method integrates past causes with present to future conditions. 23 
 Local agency for risk reduction requires action across scales, aware of trade-offs. 24 
Introduction 25 
25 years since the publication of ‘At Risk’, there is a long history of scholarship indebted to 26 
understanding the social vulnerabilities that drive disasters as well as the negative impacts of global 27 
environmental change. Such scholarship has long emphasised the need to understand the causal drivers 28 
of risk beyond hazard, and account for causal factors in risk assessments (Blaikie et al. 1994; Oliver-29 
Smith et al. 2016). The importance of understanding and addressing how disasters are socially as well 30 
as physically constructed remains. This reflects a backdrop of rising global disaster losses despite the 31 
increased application of science and technology in disaster risk management. This is symptomatic of a 32 
continued need to address underlying vulnerabilities and their causes in analytical and applied work 33 
(White et al. 2001; Lemos and Tompkins 2008; Oliver-Smith et al. 2016). While the imperative for 34 
momentum is recognised in disaster risk reduction frameworks and processes, this needs to be supported 35 
by mechanisms for practice that better drive integration between risk reduction and broader 36 
development processes (Djalante and Lassa 2019). Existing risk assessment methodologies still largely 37 
overview current vulnerabilities, capacities and post-disaster conditions.  While important, this stops 38 
short of investigating how risks and vulnerabilities arise (DKKV 2012). This limits the potential for 39 
risk and vulnerability reduction and drives a focus on short-term, partial policy solutions rather than on 40 
measures that could support sustainable reductions in disaster risk. 41 
This paper reports on the application of a framework developed as part of the Preparing for Extreme 42 
and Rare Events in Coastal Regions (PEARL) project (2014-2018). The project aimed to provide a 43 
systematic assessment of the causal drivers of flood risk as part of the development of a holistic disaster 44 
risk management approach for coastal communities. This approach enabled conceptual interrogation of 45 
how global and national drivers interacted with local conditions in the context of small-scale disasters. 46 
2 
 
This responds to a long-standing gap in disasters studies about the pathways through which distant 47 
spatial and temporal conditions (or ‘root causes’) link to locally occurring risks, and how institutions 48 
function and interact within these pathways to mediate the influence of structural conditions on risk 49 
(Pelling 2003). This debate also has wider ramifications for climate change literatures driven by the 50 
question of how changing global conditions interact with locally expressing risks (Leichenko et al. 51 
2010). Situating flood risk management within the co-evolving social and environmental system that 52 
shapes it, this paper also responds to calls from disasters scholars to broaden analysis from a focus on 53 
the legislation, policies, plans and procedures related to the management of hazards and disasters to the 54 
underlying socio-political and economic contexts within which management takes place (Tierney 2012; 55 
Scolobig 2017). It places disasters and disaster risk management in their broader development context, 56 
raising questions about the possibilities for transformative change (Thomalla et al. 2018).  57 
The study of small-scale but recurrent and high-impact events is often neglected. This is despite their 58 
demonstrated importance to local human development outcomes as well as accumulated and aggregated 59 
disaster losses and damages (Wisner and Gaillard 2009; Marulanda et al. 2010; Zaidi 2018). This 60 
analytic focus brings to the fore strong links to underlying social drivers including local governance 61 
(Zaidi 2018). However, the spatial and temporal dimensions of such drivers have yet to be 62 
systematically examined. Existing work identifies the key role of local actors as mediating institutions 63 
between local risk and loss and national and international influences. Local actors have acquired a 64 
central focus for resilience planning and the operationalisation of global goals for risk reduction and 65 
development, especially municipal government agencies and organised civil society (Fenton et al. 2017; 66 
Hardoy et al. 2018). Critical questions remain though as to how responsibilities for risk reduction should 67 
be structured across scales; how local capacities for resilience building have been shaped by 68 
contemporary economic and political change; and how far resilience theories – as a guide to action – 69 
promote an uncritical localisation of power (Joseph 2013; Welsh 2014). 70 
Section 2 examines approaches to disaster risk causation, including the approach adopted for this paper, 71 
through the lens of governance, scale and systems. Section 3 discusses methodological approach and 72 
technique. Section 4 presents findings and discussion from three case study contexts of urban flood risk 73 
management influenced by European Union finance, regulation and governance. The conclusion draws 74 
together implications for research and practice.  75 
2. Approaches to disaster risk causation and the role of governance 76 
Local-scale manifestations of risk and vulnerability relate to wider contextual factors (Bohle 2001) and 77 
are produced in the complex interactions between physical and social systems (DKKV 2012; Huang et 78 
al. 2013). Within the disasters literature, systematic approaches to understanding these interacting 79 
causes of risk remain indebted to the ‘Pressure and Release’ (PAR) Model. This links the production of 80 
vulnerability to the production of hazard, explaining vulnerability creation through the relationship 81 
between distant spatial and temporal ‘root causes’ (or systemic conditions), intervening pressures and 82 
locally manifesting unsafe conditions (Blaikie et al. 1994; Pelling 2003). This has given rise to various 83 
models for ‘root cause analysis’ which operationalise the PAR model, including the Forensic 84 
Investigations of Disasters (FORIN) project, which aims to institutionalise causal investigation as part 85 
of disaster risk reduction practice (Oliver-Smith et al. 2016). These models and a derivation for the 86 
context of the PEARL project were reviewed in detail in Fraser et al. 2016. Critical elements of this 87 
derived framework, as shown in Fig.1, were that it was holistic, linking physical, economic, governance 88 
and psychosocial drivers to ongoing processes of risk reduction and creation through the production of 89 
hazard, exposure and vulnerability (risk). Hazard events give rise to disasters that unfold across and 90 
interact with social and political worlds. Core aspects of disaster risk management are nested within 91 
this context.   92 




Source: Fraser et al. 2016 95 
The application of this framework in the context of small-scale disasters opens up conceptual questions 96 
about governance, scale and systems in explanations of risk causation. These relate back to the general 97 
model first proposed by the PAR. Governance has been emphasised as a key driver of risk (Oliver Smith 98 
et al. 2016; Ahrens and Rudolph 2006), but the institutional pathways which mediate the influence of 99 
broader structural changes on local risks have been much less detailed (Pelling 2003). Such pathways 100 
are recognised to involve informal as well as formal institutions, or the “socially shared rules…created, 101 
communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Leftwich 2007, p.10). These 102 
range from spontaneous organisational arrangements (Green 2005; Blackburn 2014; Marks and Lebel 103 
2015) to ad hoc shared norms and political cultures (Mauelshagen 2009). Less considered in the 104 
disasters literature are the different temporalities of institutional change, such as policy reforms, 105 
including the disaster management cycle. These can be fluid or more embedded, with the ordering of 106 
events important to the resulting outcomes (Mauelshagen 2009; Tierney 2012; Leftwich 2007; Pierson 107 
2004). As discussed, the attention to small-scale disasters flags local governance as a pivot point within 108 
more widely scaled governance systems. Understanding this politics of scale and access builds on the 109 
original PAR model and its derivations (Sandoval and Boano 2014), but brings its own theoretical 110 
considerations. 111 
2.1 Understanding scale: risk as globally and locally co-constructed 112 
The Pressure and Release model depends on a vertically driven model of causation. This views the 113 
relationship between macro-level processes and local risks as one of globally driven constraint on local 114 
environments. This perspective is echoed in climate change adaptation scholarship concerned with the 115 
influence of global environmental change on local climate change governance and risks (Adger et al. 116 
2009; Leichenko et al. 2010) and with the inter-relationship between global environmental change and 117 
the impact of contemporary economic and political changes, including global economic crisis and 118 
subsequent austerity programmes (Liverman and Vilas 2006; Eakin and Tompkins 2006; Wilson et al. 119 
2014; Wright 2016). The impacts of the 2009 crisis and austerity on disaster risk management 120 
programmes have been much less well traced.  121 
Conversely, accounts of local agency to manage risks have been critiqued for a lack of engagement 122 
with the impact of broader-scale shocks, and the implications of the spatial ‘stretching’ of policy 123 
decisions (Chelleri et al. 2015). As questions have been asked about the impacts of decentralisation on 124 
the local governance of disaster risk, there has been increasing attention to the ‘politics of scale’ in 125 
disaster risk management. This draws attention to the ways in which socially constructed and temporally 126 
fluid relationships between stakeholders more or less physically proximate to local contexts shapes 127 
responses at this scale (Fraser 2006; Blackburn 2014; Sandoval and Boano 2014; Paterson et al. 2017; 128 
Marks and Lebel 2015). As well as offering a theoretical route out of singularly localised conceptions 129 
of resilience, understanding the politics of scale in risk production reframes globally driven or rigidly 130 
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hierarchical accounts of the linkages between local risk and major global processes. These can be seen 131 
as mutually constitutive global-local interactions rather than global ‘structures’ touching down in ‘local’ 132 
contexts to be met by ‘local agency’ (Leitner and Miller 2007).  133 
This view of scale is doubly productive in informing our understanding of the systemic interactions 134 
across physical and social domains through which risks occur. Systems approaches have been brought 135 
together with the Pressure and Release Model to enrich understanding of the complexity of causal 136 
interactions (e.g. Huang et al. 2013). However, the treatment of scale within systems retains a view of 137 
institutions as nested and hierarchical, and scale as functional and rigid (Newig and Moss 2017; Roland 138 
2004). This can be re-framed through a politics of scale approach (Newig and Moss 2017; Paterson et 139 
al. 2017).  140 
2.2 Between functionalism and contingency: towards a critical epistemology of disasters 141 
Deepening conceptualisations of governance and scale, therefore, may shed greater light on the 142 
intervening institutional pathways that link international and national drivers with local risk conditions. 143 
Such analysis highlights the scalar co-production of disasters operating through power relations within 144 
shifting institutional configurations (Brenner 2001) of formal and informal institutions. It shows the 145 
ways in which this mediates access to and control over relevant resources, regulatory and governance 146 
structures. In the context of small-scale disasters, local actors appear as critical intermediaries and their 147 
role in determining root causes requires better exploration. The following sections trace the application 148 
of a holistic root cause framework for doing so. At a deeper level, this raises questions about our 149 
epistemology of disaster causation. On the one hand, the basic systems model of pressure and release 150 
has been challenged to go further in explaining both the non-linearity and discontinuities of the inter-151 
locking ‘systems of systems’ that drive disaster occurrence (Zaidi 2018). On the other, the ‘search for 152 
root causes’ is challenged by a view of disasters as created in place and time-dependent networks of 153 
physical and non-physical forces (Donovan 2017). This paper presents an approach that avoids both the 154 
implied functionalism of the systems approach and the contingency of the networks approach. It treats 155 
causation as both political and structural, open to systematic investigations that can identify 156 
interventions for social change (Storper and Scott 2016).  157 
3. Methods: Using a comparative approach to understand the past causes of contemporary risk 158 
conditions 159 
The research took place across three case study sites – St Maarten in the Dutch Caribbean; Genoa, Italy 160 
and Rethymno, Crete (see Fraser 2016; Scolobig 2017 and Mavrogenis 2016). This approach responded 161 
to a stated need to draw systematic conclusions about disaster causation and governance using 162 
comparative studies (Burby 2006; Handmer and Dovers 2007, Tierney 2012) whilst being sensitive to 163 
the influence of particular histories and cultures on causal factors (Alcántara-Ayala and Oliver-Smith 164 
2019). The three contexts all experienced recent small-scale, recurrent flood events. They shared a 165 
history of tourism-led urban development, occurring from the beginning of the twentieth century in 166 
Genoa and in the post-war period in St Maarten and Rethymno. The in-migration and unplanned 167 
urbanisation that characterised such development was identified by stakeholders as highly significant 168 
to the formation of contemporary flood risk. Local political visions and narratives were largely oriented 169 
to the promotion of development and growth over sensitivity to risk reduction. However, each context 170 
had established local architectures for risk management and histories of local commitment to and 171 
investment in risk reduction. Difference between the case study sites emerged in the scalar location of 172 
power. Economically Genoa, Italy, was well integrated as a large, national port city and situated in a 173 
‘core’ region of the EU (Magone et al. 2016). Rethymno, Crete, was situated in a ‘peripheral’ nation of 174 
the EU (ibid.) and economically marginal across all scales. St Maarten, in the Dutch Caribbean, was 175 
also economically dependent as a small island economy, and, from 2010, devolved but politically 176 
dependent on the Kingdom of the Netherlands. From 2010, its relationship to the EU has been as an 177 
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Overseas Country and Territory of the European Union (therefore not subject to EU regulation and no 178 
longer eligible for EU funds).  179 
Data was primarily derived from semi-structured interviews. The framework displayed in Figure 1 was 180 
adapted as a thematic grid to represent both the time dimensions of the study (past, present and future 181 
relative to the date of the interviews) and the nature of the causes identified (physical, socio-economic 182 
and governance). A blank grid was used as a starting point to structure interviews, with participants 183 
asked to reflect on the causes of relevant, contemporaneous flood events, and relate their explanations 184 
of the causes to present and future risk conditions in each locale. This method for relating past causes 185 
to contemporary risk conditions marked a departure from earlier studies of disaster causation which 186 
have explained the past causes of single, past events (IRDR 2011).  187 
The choice of events under discussion was determined by documentary analysis of the range of events 188 
occurring in the case studies in the recent past, as well as initial open discussions with knowledgeable 189 
stakeholders (such as specialist academics and government officials). As further details about causal 190 
pathways emerged, more detailed and locally specific questions were introduced to compare and 191 
triangulate stakeholder perspectives. Through asking about structural causes as well as decision-making 192 
processes that occurred across different organisations to prepare for, respond to and recover from 193 
particular disaster events, agency-structure interactions were revealed as part of a co-evolving system.  194 
Contemporary narratives are perpetuated by particular knowledge systems, which change over time 195 
(Jeffers 2014). Questions about causation can be highly politicised and may elicit only partial answers 196 
in formal interview settings. We therefore sought to interview as many different types of stakeholder as 197 
we could (See Table 1). Requests for anonymity meant that we could only reveal the organisation within 198 
which we interviewed, and not further details about interviewees. In all case studies, we snowballed out 199 
from initial contacts derived through the PEARL project. Interviewees were selected based on their role 200 
and / or experience. As interviewees had differing knowledge and experience of different floods, we 201 
adapted the questions according to their most relevant experience. The interviews were in-depth, 202 
typically lasting 1-2 hours. Although the exact profile of the stakeholders we interviewed varied across 203 
the case studies, the commonality of the approach and method allow comparable findings to be 204 
displayed, as shown in Section 4.  205 
Across all three case studies, initial documentary analysis drew on the site-specific academic and policy 206 
literatures. These were identified using searches for flood events occurring in the recent past as well as 207 
disaster risk management in the local and national contexts. Where relevant to our causal analysis, texts 208 
were then included in the body of evidence we coded and analysed against our framework (bearing in 209 
mind that such reports also represented particular forms of narrative construction, influenced by 210 
editorial styles and other organisational viewpoints, as above). The exact weight of the methods used 211 
in each case study varied. In Genoa, a vast existing literature was available, while stakeholder fatigue 212 
was high. The researcher therefore relied on telephone interviews but also a large-scale review of media 213 
articles. In St Maarten, a heavy reliance on oral culture and lack of written documents meant the analysis 214 
mainly focused on face-to-face interviews.  While the construction of our data corpus varied in this 215 
way, the use of a common grid unified the findings, and in all cases, multiple methods provided a means 216 
of triangulation and verification.  217 
Table 1: Methods by case study site 218 
 Focal disaster events Principal methods 
Stakeholder types 
interviewed 
Genoa, Italy 2011 and 2014 floods 17 semi-structured 
telephone interviews; 
document review of 
laws, technical reports 
from regional, 










river basin and 
emergency plans, 
climate adaptation 
plans, research reports, 
academic articles, and 
relevant media reports, 
including more than 
150 news articles 
published online 
between 2010 and 
2015 relating to risk 
management and the 
2011 and 2014 floods.  
planning and 
communications; 






lawyers; Centre on 
environmental 
monitoring. 
Rethymno, Crete Small-scale, recurrent 
annual flooding as 




findings from a 
stakeholder workshop. 
Document review of 
academic publications 
and grey literature 
(technical and research 
studies and project 
reports).  
 
National and local 
water resources and 
civil protection 
agencies and NGOs; 
Former Mayor; Port 
authorities; Hotel and 
restaurant owners; 
Local households. 
Dutch St Maarten, 
Caribbean 




review of academic 
publications and grey 
literature, media 










Harbour and Marina 
companies 
 219 
Each case study was limited by differential access to particular stakeholders caused by workload, staff 220 
turnover, unexpected events and respondent fatigue. The findings also reflect the ability of stakeholders 221 
to reflect on historic and future trajectories. The temporal horizon of the research was limited to that 222 
articulated by interviewees. It therefore tended to confine to the recent (multi-annual) and medium-term 223 
past (multi-decadal), with less perspective on the deep past (centennial). This nevertheless still allowed 224 
for ample perspective on the pathways of influence from spatially distant to local events, as well as for 225 
expressions of continuity and discontinuity in the past that went beyond what would have been possible 226 
from a ‘snapshot’ of present risk conditions. It was also challenging for interviewees to articulate inter-227 
linkages stretching beyond their scope of vision. Interviews were therefore undertaken across different 228 
spatial and jurisdictional levels of governance where possible.  229 
The challenges revealed by the approach reflect the complexity of analysing cause-effect relations of 230 
inter-linked drivers over scales and time, where temporal continuities and dis-continuities – and their 231 
significance into the present and future – were not always detectable (Pierson 2004). As Sandoval and 232 
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Boano suggest, approaching scale as socially constructed from the local perspective outwards can 233 
facilitate making empirical connections between distant socioeconomic and political processes and 234 
disaster events (Sandoval and Boano 2014). Temporal discontinuity meant a need to reflect on the 235 
nature of changing contemporary conditions with stakeholders, as well as choosing carefully which 236 
events to study. Respondents felt it easier to comment on the causes and effects of management to recent 237 
than past events. The overall approach of using disaster events as the analytic ‘window’ through which 238 
to view underlying social processes was valuable as an interview technique to move respondents beyond 239 
broad-brush opinions and pre-existing conceptions. However, it needed to be considered that events 240 
(especially small-scale) produce highly localised impacts with differing initial or local causal pathways. 241 
In response, both 2014 Hurricane Gonzalo, which produced major consequences for the local marine 242 
sector, and flash floods in 2005, that affected hillside districts, were included in the St Maarten case 243 
study. The same was true for the Genoa case, which included the 2011 and 2014 flood events.  244 
4. Findings and discussion 245 
In practice, researchers modified the Figure 1 framework to accommodate stakeholder responses to it. 246 
Findings brought the psychosocial element of the framework into flood risk governance. This reflected 247 
the exclusion of household and community perceptions. The findings also drew together hazard, 248 
exposure and vulnerability as components of risk rather than mapping the drivers of each element 249 
separately. This responded to the interlinked nature of flood events that led to significant overlap 250 
between these drivers of risk and loss. As mentioned, in each case there were established local 251 
architectures for risk management that were vital sources of resilience, in particular in reducing losses 252 
to life. The analytic focus of the Figure 1 Framework on understanding the broader context for risk 253 
drivers tended to downplay this. However, the implications of the analysis for thinking about the 254 
conditions under which such agency occurred are discussed in Section 5.    255 
i. Rethymno, Greece 256 
Rethymno, a port town and regional commercial, administrative and cultural centre in Crete, Greece, 257 
with a population of around 40,000 residents, experienced flooding due to storm waves and flash floods. 258 
Wave overtopping in the harbour and wider coastal area disrupted port operations, damaged facilities 259 
and cargo, caused traffic problems and damaged coastal shops and restaurants. Adjacent recreational 260 
beaches were exposed to erosion. The table below summarises stakeholder viewpoints, as reported in 261 
2015, on the causes of small-scale annual flood risk across the domains of the risk root cause analysis 262 
framework and over time.   263 
Table 2: Risk Root Causes in Rethymno 264 
Causes of 
risk 
Past (Prior to 2015) Present (2015) Future (2015 onwards) 
Physical Exposure to strong winds; coastal 
location at confluence mountain 
streams; topography 
As past As past; Climate change 
induced changes in wind 
conditions and sea levels 
Socio-
economic 
Rapid, unplanned urbanisation from 
1970s; accompanied by social 
fragmentation; development 
interests override flood risk 
governance  
 
Decentralisation from 1960s fails to 
bring local resources  
 
National austerity policies from 









lack holistic risk 
governance. 
In context of austerity, 
municipal agencies 
moving to undertake 
smaller-scale 
infrastructure works, 
drawing more strongly on 
the capacities of the non-
governmental sector but 
also beginning to place 




Authority raising funds to 
reconstruct the old harbour and 
diminish the capacity of local civil 
protection. 
maintenance and non-
structural measures.    
 
Development visions for 
tourism as a counter to 
recession. 
Governance Structural protection in place from 
1990s due to EU funds.  
Dominant reliance on engineering 
solutions eclipses more holistic 
forms of risk governance - a 
background of party-based political 
clientelism precludes broader 
stakeholder involvement in local 
flood risk management, including 
greater public awareness raising and 
collaboration with volunteer groups.  
 
Institutional fragmentation across 
national agencies and between 
governance levels prevents any local 
impact of regulatory and governance 
measures through the EU Flood 
Directive (2007) and national 
platform for disaster risk reduction 
under the Hyogo Framework.  
 
2010 institutional reforms move 
power for risk management from 
local authorities to regional (sub-
national) jurisdictions and away 
from local civil protection agencies 
to the fire brigade (where flood risk 
management loses priority to forest 
fires). EU funding is then targeted at 
this level. Responsibilities for 










lack holistic risk 
governance.  
Harsh austerity 
conditions open up new 
possibilities for disasters 
governance by breaking 
with clientelistic party-
based relationships and 
prompting the 
development of new 
social networks. 
Source: Mavrogenis 2016, based on interviews and a stakeholder workshop undertaken in 2015. 265 
The causal pathways that drove risk are clearly interlinked across the domains we outline. Importantly, 266 
the primacy of governance arrangements was marked, in shaping the scale and nature of flood impacts 267 
and a number of institutional pathways revealed. The convergence of austerity programmes from 2010 268 
and the 2010 rescaling of government functions exerted a strong influence on the recent past. It 269 
exacerbated the already weak capacity of local actors to access EU funding for mitigation and 270 
maintenance works and to undertake protection. The local civil protection office in Rethymno reported 271 
having just one member of staff in 2015, while the regional office was also under-staffed and reliant on 272 
EU programmes supporting the wages of young professionals (Interview Civil Protection Agency 273 
02/06/2015). The 2010 legal and administrative reforms left “no chance for pre-disaster planning” as 274 
all responsibilities went from local authorities, who focussed on all disaster types, to the fire brigade, 275 
focussed on forest fires (Interview Red Cross representative 08/06/2015).  276 
By looking backwards from a contemporary starting point, the analysis also reveals the shifting politics 277 
of scale that influenced local risk management. Over the time periods identified by contemporary 278 
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stakeholders as relevant, there appeared no automatically felt effect of all governance scales in local 279 
risk management, or hierarchical order to their local influence. Prior to the 1990s, as put by the former 280 
Prefect, “We have always wanted to protect the old town and the city of Rethymno from disasters….but 281 
the problem was lack of money” (Interview 08/06/2015). In the 1990s, local agency, through a pro-282 
active Mayor, was able to capitalise on the new availability of EU regional funding for risk reduction, 283 
an effective form of ‘scale jumping’. However, this local agency proved contingent and was later 284 
reversed by national reform programmes from 2010, in part a response to the EU and global economic 285 
crisis.  286 
Critical from this ‘forensic’ analysis at the local scale was the influence of underlying and longer-287 
running institutional conditions on the impact on local risks of changes in higher-level structural 288 
conditions. The tradition of clientelism and party politics was agreed by most interviewees to be among 289 
the major root causes of risk in Rethymno. Persistent clientelism prevented movement to more holistic 290 
risk governance models. An interviewee from a local volunteer group for civil protection explained how 291 
they were not supported by the local authorities, commenting, “Party politics are the main reason for 292 
the lack of support to the team of volunteers” (Interview 09/06/2015). This and other institutional 293 
conditions compounded the influence of austerity rather than being created by it. Interviews across the 294 
local, regional and national levels of government illustrated institutional fragmentation across national 295 
ministries and between the national, regional and local levels. This impeded the completion of EU 296 
infrastructural projects at the local level, for example, which required 25% national participation – 297 
exacerbating new resource constraints. The possibilities identified for change into the future included 298 
austerity’s impacts breaking clientelistic relationships at the local level. This raises questions about the 299 
immutability of institutional features and whether in the future sustained change in local flood risk 300 
management culture will be possible without a commensurate shift in scalar responsibilities and 301 
relationships to re-orient finance, regulation and governance support to the local level.  302 
ii.  St Maarten, Dutch Caribbean 303 
Located in the Northern belt of the former Netherlands Antilles, the island of St Maarten represents a 304 
local-scale jurisdiction (size of approximately 60,000 inhabitants). Since 2010, it has been an 305 
autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands (with national responsibilities in all areas 306 
except foreign policy, defence and some judicial functions). The average recurrence of significant 307 
damage to residential and commercial areas from flooding is estimated at 2 years (Ministry of Public 308 
Health, Spatial Planning, Environment and Infrastructure 2015), associated with both hurricane 309 
conditions and local flood events during the rainy season. The table below summarises the drivers of 310 
risk as reported in 2015 through stakeholder accounts of the 2005 and 2014 floods. 311 
Table 3: Risk Root Causes in St Maarten 312 
Causes of 
risk 
Past (Prior to 2015) Present (2015) Future (2015 
onwards) 
Physical Location; topography; morphology 
(altered by storms and development 
over inland ponds, mangroves and 
sea outlets) leads to hazard impacts 
of hurricanes and localised 
flooding; small island status leads 
to resource constraint 
As past – key moment 
for change storms of 







Colonial marginalisation constrains 
resources  
 
Physical landscapes altered through 
development from 1960s e.g. 
As past – key moment 
for change 2010 
devolution which alters 
access to resources from 
Netherlands and the EU 
Future 
development 




infilling and dredging; demographic 
pressure results in unplanned 
urbanisation in hazardous areas; 
patterns of land ownership 
exacerbate erosion and impede 
emergency access; structural 
economic dependence on migrants 
creates vulnerabilities 
Governance Colonial marginalisation leads to 
lack of administrative development  
 
Lack of oversight and enforcement 
of Dutch and local land and 
building regulation and lack of 
preparedness (beyond forecasting 
and warning) reflects political drive 
to develop and political interests in 
land ownership; patronage system 
means lack of political platform for 
risk reduction; lack of public sector 
capacity and strong civil society. 
As past – key moment 
for change 2010 
devolution, which 
compounds the 
weakness of the local 
political party system – 
leading to continued 
failure in strategic, long-
term decision-making 










Source: Fraser 2016 based on interviews undertaken in 2015 and documentary and media analysis.   313 
In the St Maarten case, the mechanics of scale in governance differed to Rethymno but similarly occured 314 
against the persistent blockage of local institutions. These prevented significant movement to risk-315 
informed development and land use planning and moderated the impact of higher-level regulations. 316 
Despite local policies from the 1990s for beach and hillside protection and national legal regulation, 317 
recent decades were described as a development “free for all” by one government official (Interview 318 
Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment and Infrastructure, 28/07/2015). According 319 
to a private sector representative, “Preparedness was never a priority, the priority was rebuilding and 320 
maintaining tourist numbers” (Interview St Maarten Trade and Hospitality Association, 07/08/2015). 321 
Against a backdrop of resource constraint as a small island, the relationship between the St Maarten 322 
government, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the European Union strongly influenced access to 323 
resources for flood protection infrastructure. Prior to 2010, St Maarten’s integrated status as part of the 324 
Netherlands Federation enabled access to Dutch and EU development aid. This pre-financed 325 
infrastructure and social development projects that were not seen locally as an investment priority, such 326 
as water and sewage infrastructure, in places that were not a local political priority (because they lay 327 
outside the capital Philipsburg and the main tourist areas). This aid in part cushioned the effect of the 328 
2009-2011 economic slump St Maarten experienced as a result of the 2008 global economic downturn. 329 
There was little reported impact of this downturn on disaster risk management reported by interviewees 330 
on the island in 2015-2016. 331 
As Table 3 indicates, these scalar relationships were reconfigured with the vote for autonomy and the 332 
devolution of power to the local government in 2010. The vote lost St Maarten access to Dutch 333 
development aid and EU funding through the European Development Fund (as St Maarten became an 334 
Associate Member of the EU). A debt relief settlement with the Dutch imposed tight fiscal ceilings and 335 
restrictions on international borrowing. As one government official explained, “Now we have to be self-336 
reliant and it is a huge challenge” (Interview Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, Environment 337 
and Infrastructure, 28/07/2015). Under new resource constraints, trade-offs between risk reduction and 338 
economic development objectives (noted by Paterson et al. 2017) driven by pre-existing local political 339 
interests in land development become more apparent, and compounded the influence of underlying 340 
economic development pathways. One government official reflected: “Cost is not our friend…but it is 341 
also a question of political choices” (Interview Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning, 342 
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Environment and Infrastructure, 31/07/2015). In 2012-2014 a reported 30% of planned drainage 343 
projects were completed, but at the time of interviews in 2015 and 2016 none had been undertaken since 344 
2014, after the government committed the available budget to purchase land instead.   345 
iii. Genoa, Italy 346 
The municipality of Genoa, North West Italy, differs significantly from both Rethymno and Dutch St 347 
Maarten in its larger jurisdictional size (cf. 600,000 inhabitants) but also its relative national economic 348 
importance, as the sixth largest urban centre in Italy and major seaport. The city has experienced an 349 
increase in the intensity of flood events in the past 50 years, causing casualties, evacuations, 350 
displacements and severe damage. The Bisagno river is of particular focus, flowing through the most 351 
urbanised part of Genoa, with around 100,000 inhabitants as well as associated economic and industrial 352 
activities. The table below summarises the drivers of risk as reported in 2015 through stakeholder 353 
accounts of the 2011 and 2014 floods. 354 
Table 4: Risk root causes in Genoa 355 
Causes of risk Past (Prior to 2015) Present (2015) Future (2015 
onwards) 
Physical Morphology of steep 
slopes and small coastal 
plains; erosion; short 




limited funding for risk 
protection works. 
As past; increased intensity 
of flood events 
As past; More 
frequent drought 
periods and heavy 
rainfall with climate 
change 
Socio-economic Demographic growth 
until 1970; urbanisation 
unharmonised with risk 
planning; criteria for 
funding distribution for 




from 2011 exacerbate 
the limited resources 
available for the public 
sector and human 
resources for risk 
reduction, and shift 
priorities away from risk 
mitigation at the local 
and regional scale 
Lack of dataset/overview of 
allocated and transferred 





and place of residence 
as main social 










1990s does not bring 
more local funding; 
Lack of implementation 
of structural measures 
Despite policy changes 
following the 2014 floods 
Legal conflicts block the 
use of (already) limited 
monetary resources as well 
as project implementation; 
too much responsibility at 
local level/too little 





delays in reinforcing the 
banks of the Bisagno 
river.  
anti-corruption measures 
slowing down the system; 
excessive number of 
authorities  
Source: Scolobig 2017, based on interviews undertaken in 2015, documentary analysis and media 356 
analysis. 357 
In Genoa, austerity conditions compounded pre-existing forms of institutional weakness, including 358 
budgetary and human resource constraints exacerbated by the large number of organisations with 359 
responsibilities in managing local disaster risk. As reported by an interviewee in the Regional 360 
Environment Agency, “in the past years the limited monetary resources available for the public sector 361 
affected risk mitigation very badly. For example in the regional council, the health sector was always 362 
considered a priority in comparison with the risk sector” (Interview 01/07/2015). In other words 363 
mainstreaming flood risk mitigation in decision making at the local and regional level proved to be an 364 
extremely difficult task in times of austerity.  365 
 366 
However, a wide spectrum of interviewees (including representatives of the Regional Coastal 367 
Ecosystem and Water Management Team, International Centre on Environmental Monitoring, 368 
University experts, Municipal Urban Planning Office and Regional Environment Agency) maintained 369 
that one of the root causes of increased risk and vulnerability in Genova was the “risk mitigation 370 
stalemate”. Physical protection defences have not been built and flood risk remained extremely high. 371 
“The most serious problem as regards flood risk management in Genova is the risk mitigation stalemate. 372 
Notwithstanding the funding allocated for building structural mitigation works, little has been done to 373 
mitigate risk, even after events which caused several casualties” (Interview NGO Representatives 374 
07/07/2015). Inability to improve physical measures reflected a local-level deadlock in the transfer and 375 
use of resources made available by higher levels. The implementation of flood risk management plans 376 
required by the European Floods Directive by the year 2015 standardised the basis for financial 377 
allocations at the national scale according to new risk maps, with favourable results for financial 378 
allocations to Genoa. Further, the 2011 and 2014 flood emergencies in Genoa prompted positive 379 
national-level policy change. A new governmental unit aimed at reducing hydrogeological risk was 380 
created; the criteria for distributing funding for risk mitigation among Italian regions changed (from the 381 
number of inhabitants/ region size to the risk levels); and the ‘Unblock Italy decree’ foresaw new urgent 382 
measures to reduce hydrological risks in municipalities. 383 
  384 
Interviewees attributed stalemate to local effects of legal trials and reciprocal corruption accusations 385 
among the companies competing to undertake contracts or receive a tender for building protection 386 
works. After 2010, three trials (Liguria Tribunal, Lazio Tribunal, State Council Tribunal) prevented the 387 
implementation of physical risk mitigation measures. The rotation of Directors in charge of approving 388 
public spending — to avoid bribery — or the ‘anti-mafia certificate’ (a compulsory anti-corruption 389 
certificate necessary to undertake a contract for building protection works) also considerably slowed 390 
down the implementation of the projects. Interviewees from government and academia further 391 
articulated how this more recent development exacerbated long-standing institutional issues, such as 392 
over-regulation in disaster risk management, leading to decisional inertia because of responsibility 393 
overlaps and lengthy procedures.    394 
iv. Discussion  395 
The study’s approach to contextualising the broader conditions that drive risk, coupled with the new 396 
requirements of scale brought by a predominant focus on small-scale disasters, reveals co-constructed 397 
institutional pathways of risk reduction and creation. Through such pathways, structural change at 398 
higher levels interacts with local institutional conditions. Higher-level economic constraints (driven by 399 
austerity programmes from 2010 in Greece and devolution from 2010 in St Maarten) certainly exerted 400 
downward pressure on local risk management in all of the cases, squeezing priorities and human 401 
resources. However, these constraints worked to exacerbate pre-existing institutional conditions, such 402 
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as the institutional fragmentation and short-term political interests in tourist and land development 403 
experienced in all three cases. These institutional conditions also prevented higher-level, formal 404 
governance and regulatory frameworks from having any felt impact at the local level.  This included 405 
the failure of the 2007 EU flood directive to embed in Rethymno and in St Maarten, the lack of purchase 406 
of Dutch land-use regulation ordinances dating back to the 1990s. The focus in our analysis of the role 407 
of local institutional conditions and responsibilities goes beyond existing descriptions in the relevant 408 
literatures of the local impacts of global and national economic and political changes as driven 409 
downwards by structural forces (e.g. Leichenko et al. 2010). On the other hand, the analysis does not 410 
imply we should focus exclusively on the workings of local institutions in order to understand disaster 411 
causation., The case studies reveal the interaction of local institutions with changes occurring at high 412 
spatial and temporal resolutions and the influence of this interaction on small-scale but high local impact 413 
risks. This demonstrates that processes occurring at higher scales are not just confined to impacts of 414 
large-scale, intensive events, as previous studies have shown (IRDR 2011). This suggests an even more 415 
widespread significance of findings to debates about distribution across scale of responsibility for risk 416 
reduction. 417 
A politics of scale approach usefully illuminates the relational shifts in power that occur over scales to 418 
close or release access to resources, regulation and governance frameworks for risk reduction. In 419 
Rethymno and St Maarten, political and economic marginality from global, regional and national power 420 
was compounded by the closing of access to resources at higher scales from 2010 in both cases. This 421 
further pressurised local risk management capacities. A central finding of this paper, however, is to 422 
show that this relational politics of scale is not the only institutional politics at work. Indeed, informal 423 
political arrangements may in fact exert a stronger influence on local risk reduction pathways. Genoa 424 
is emblematic in this regard. Flood events in Genoa exert a stronger felt impact on higher-scale actors 425 
than in the other two case studies, releasing resources to the local level. This is revealing of its political, 426 
economic and demographic status. However, the power of size is double-edged and, when coupled with 427 
its informal politics, enables local actors to block the use of resources made available for risk reduction. 428 
Any advantages of size (Paterson et al. 2017) are inhibited.  429 
Underpinning this, the temporal sequencing of events matters to politics (Pierson 2004). In part as a 430 
result of the timing and nature of relative institutional shifts of power, authority and resources, St 431 
Maarten was better able than Rethymno to withstand the impacts of the global/EU economic crisis (with 432 
support from the Netherlands and the EU available in 2008). The later loss of higher-level resources 433 
through the 2010 decentralisation reforms exacerbated the influence of historic marginalisation and 434 
local political clientelism on risk reduction efforts. Across all three cases, abrupt shifts in scalar 435 
responsibilities through policy reform met persistent – but not immutable – institutional conditions such 436 
as fragmentation and clientelism. The outcomes for risk reduction were produced in the interaction 437 
between these differing temporalities of change in institutions.   438 
Analysis revealed the inter-connectedness of socio-economic and governance drivers and their non-439 
linearity, as shifts in wider policy regimes drove positive and negative outcomes for risk reduction at 440 
the local scale.  Understanding how this also relates to the materialities of hazard and physical change 441 
certainly matters. The degree of influence of hazard impacts on policy was affected by the degree of 442 
impact, being felt most strongly in St Maarten and Genoa after major disaster events that required 443 
national support. However, this was not a linear relationship - the politics of institutional change (such 444 
as decentralisation and austerity) also drove systems (Roland 2004). Within the risk and resilience field, 445 
this interaction between physical events and institutional processes of change creates a complex process 446 
of coevolution, neither driven solely through institutional hierarchies (Chelleri et al. 2015; Zaidi 2018) 447 
or contingent disaster impacts (Donovan 2017).  448 
The analysis raises questions about whether decentralising power and resources down to the local is the 449 
most effective route to supporting local agency without commensurate change at other spatial scales, 450 
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and change in wider institutional practices (Blackburn 2014; Paterson 2017). The evidence indicates 451 
three mechanisms which influence interventions across scales: trade-offs, context and entry points.  452 
First, trade-offs which occur when broader institutional conditions change. This is epitomised by the 453 
case of Genoa, where the strengthening of one system (regional and national anti-corruption legislation 454 
to avoid bribery in public spending) weakened the functioning of another (local physical mitigation 455 
works) with negative effects on risk exposure and vulnerability (Scolobig 2017). Contrary to other 456 
accounts of disaster-development trade-offs which assume that ‘good governance’ will reap rewards 457 
for disasters management, all good things do not always ‘go together’ (Tuhkanen et al. 2018).  458 
Second, intervention at higher scales in the context of weak local institutions can still be partially 459 
effective for risk reduction. In St Maarten the flow of resources from national and regional institutions 460 
cushioned tensions between local economic development agendas – driven by uneven political interests 461 
– and risk reduction. However, it left systemic reform of local institutions unaddressed, marginalising 462 
community-led response.  463 
Third, the dynamics of local agency, suggestive of entry points for risk reduction. Across all three case 464 
studies, changes in the parameters of local agency are shown to emerge endogenously - for example, 465 
owing to the activism of a local Mayor in Rethymno or the re-negotiation of statehood for St Maarten. 466 
Such parameters can also be influenced by national-level action, such as change in funding criteria for 467 
Genoa on the back of EU regulation. However, in Rethymno and St Maarten, in the context of local 468 
resource constraints, this only translated into action for risk reduction when local actions were aligned 469 
with resources and strategies occurring across scales. While changes in institutional practices were 470 
indicated to open possibilities for local risk reduction, these also had contradictory effects. This was the 471 
case with formal, institutional reform in Genoa (legal trials stalled mitigation works) and St Maarten 472 
(devolution and conditionality exacerbated trade-offs but might have increased accountability). Such a 473 
context of complexity means finding interventions that are ‘best fit’ for context, or adapting to the 474 
political context, as well as taking advantage of a plurality of solutions, operating flexibly and working 475 
at multiple levels simultaneously to tackle complex problems (Ramalingam et al., 2013). 476 
v. Conclusion 477 
Understanding causality “should be seen as a basic rationale for disaster risk research and in 478 
substantiating disaster risk reduction practice” (Oliver-Smith et al. 2016, p.2). This paper extends the 479 
theoretical lens, method and empirical base for doing so, using case studies of small-scale disasters to 480 
re-scale causal investigations and interrogate the institutional processes that drive the influence of 481 
distant conditions on local risks. The findings raise new questions about how to pursue research into 482 
disaster causation, with the paper calling for this to be based on a more explicit epistemology of 483 
causation. Going forward, there is much potential to enrich our social scientific understanding of 484 
disaster causation through greater engagement with the growing use of historical methods to uncover 485 
the role of path dependencies and inertia in influencing contemporary risks (Adamson 2018; Parsons 486 
2019) and more explicit theorisation of policy processes (as scholars of sustainability transitions are 487 
starting to do, see Kern and Rogge 2018 and Roberts et al. 2018). Finally, the paper highlights a 488 
methodology for integrating causal analysis into risk assessment but also illustrates some of its 489 
complexities. This includes the scale of research that is required to present and corroborate a 490 
comprehensive view of causation. Going forward, this opens the possibility of a more encompassing 491 
analysis that can reach beyond the standard localised focus of formal risk assessments and begin to 492 
more fully address the question of risk causation, so that lessons and actions to reduce risk are more 493 
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